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John McDowell articulated a radical criticism of normative inferentialism against Robert
Brandom’s expressivist account of conceptual contents. One of his main concerns consists in
vindicating a notion of intentionality that could not be reduced to the deontic relations that are
established by discursive practitioners. Noticeably, large part of this discussion is focused on
empirical knowledge and observational judgments. McDowell argues that there is no role for
inference in the application of observational concepts, except the paradoxical one of justifying
the content of an observational judgment in terms of itself. This paper examines the semantical
consequences of the analysis of the content of empirical judgments in terms of their inferential
role. These, it is suggested, are distinct from the epistemological paradoxes that McDowell
charges the inferentialist approach with.
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1 Introduction
Inferentialism is a theory about how to understand conceptual content: according to the inferen-
tialist, conceptual content has to be understood primarily in terms of inferential relations between
concepts. This is the inferentialist idea at its bare bones. There are several ways to put some flesh
on it. The proof-theoretical tradition, for instance, maintains that the content of an expression
φ is to be determined in terms of the proofs we have for it. The idea is that, when inferential
rules are properly1 defined, proofs provide the epistemic guarantee that φ has been introduced on
its justificatory grounds which, in this sense, account for φ’s epistemic content. Robert Brandom’s
normative approach, instead, gathers inferentialism in a triptych together with a pragmatist thesis
and an expressivist thesis. The pragmatist thesis is the idea that the inferential role of an expres-
sion φ must be defined in terms of the normative relations that the use of φ binds speakers to in
discursive practices. The expressivist thesis amounts to the claim that the deontic statuses that
speakers acquire by engaging in discursive practices can be made explicit by deploying particular
linguistic resources. Thus, in the framework of this normative inferentialism, linguistic expres-
sions acquire the content they have because speakers use them to engage in normative discursive
practices, and these contents are expressed by various semantically explicitating vocabularies
that allow to say what people do while engaging in discursive practices. Logical vocabularies are
1Of course, the whole Gentzen-Prawitz enterprise consists in the attempt to formally cash out this adverb.
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just a case in point. So, for instance, in Brandom’s view to assert the conditional “if φ then ψ”
is to say that whoever is committed to φ ought to be committed also to φ, i.e. that the inference
from φ to ψ is to be treated as a valid one.
Inferentialism, as a semantic theory, is alternative to traditional representationalism, accord-
ing to which the content of conceptual episodes has to be understood primarily in terms of what
they designate in the world. There are many wrong ways to draw a comparison between repre-
sentationalism and inferentialism. One of these is to look at the formal apparatus for a distinc-
tion to make. Thus, one might erroneously believe that the inferentialist is not entitled to deploy
certain semantic tools, like set-theoretical models, or that the representationalist is compelled
to accept certain logical properties, like multi-consequence inference or classical contraposition.
Another problematic way to understand the comparison between inferentialism and represen-
tationalism that is likely to lead to serious puzzlements is to look at it from an epistemological
point of view. Representationalism holds that to grasp a concept is to know what it represents, for
its content is a representing thing isomorphic to a represented thing. This idea inherits the Carte-
sian distinction between a mental res, which is immediately known, and a physical res, which is
known through the mediation of the representational relation. Inferentialism holds that to grasp
a concept is to master its inferential use, for its content is the role it has in reasoning. This idea
characterizes the delimitation of the Sellarsian space of reasons, as opposed to a space of nature
where episodes are causally determined. The epistemological concern might be raised at this
point that both representationalism and inferentialism run the risk of excavating an epistemic
gulf between conceptual episodes, like perceptions and thoughts, and non-conceptual entities,
like cabbages and kings. The dreadful consequences of this picture are familiar. On the one
hand, one might attempt to build illicit foundational bridges between the two spaces. For in-
stance, one might accept that certain causally determined episodes in the space of nature could
directly provide epistemic foundation for non-inferential knowledge. Such an idea, typical of
traditional empiricism, Sellars himself stigmatized as the myth of the given. On the other hand,
one might yield to the idea that thoughts are epistemically detached from how things are in the
world, in the Davidsonian sense that beliefs the only answer to other beliefs, and accept that
coherence is only reasonable requirement for knowledge. This prefigures the Hegelian picture
of knowledge as a wheel spinning in the void. If the ship of semantics is compelled to navi-
gate in such an epistemic strait, representationalism seems to drive it to a foundationalist Scylla,
inferentialism to a coherentist Charybdis.
In the last 20 years Robert Brandom has been pursuing the ambitious enterprise of developing
a normative form of inferentialism, according to which conceptual content can be represented in
terms of inferential relations that are grounded in the normative relations established by speakers
who engage in discursive practices. This project has been discussed at length. In this paper I
will consider in particular the criticism raised by John McDowell. I will not try, however, to
adjudicate the debate between the two authors. My more modest purpose is to consider just
a small comment made by McDowell as part of his replies to Brandom’s remarks on Mind and
World. Although the comment is somehow secondary to the overall discussion, nonetheless it
presents an interesting paradox in the inferentialist analysis of empirical content. The comment
is the following one:
In the conceptual activity I am mainly concerned with, that of making obser-
2
vational judgments, what matters is the rationality exemplified in judging whether
things are thus and so in the light of whether things are (observably) thus and so.
The content of the item in the light of which a judgment of this kind has its rational
standing is the same as the content of the judgment itself. The only inferences cor-
responding to the rational connection in question would be of the “stuttering” form,
“P; so P.” (McDowell, 1998b, p. 405)
In order to evaluate this paradox I will proceed as follows. First I will present both Brandom’s
and McDowell’s theories of observation. These are two refined attempts to lead the analysis of
meaning out of the perils of epistemology, respectively from an inferentialist and a representa-
tionalist point of view. Then I will consider the details of McDowell’s criticism against normative
inferentialism. This will allow to distinguish between two sorts of problems of experience for the
inferentialist: an epistemological problem and a semantic problem. I will concede, for the sake of
the argument, that McDowell’s answer to the epistemological problem is fundamentally correct.
And eventually I will proceed to consider McDowell’s paradox in the context of the semantic
problem of experience.
2 A “two-ply” reading of Sellars’s account of observation
As a part of the ambitious recollection of inferentialist themes in the history of philosophy that
Brandom put together in his Tales of the Mighty Dead, he also proposed an interpretation of Sell-
ars’s account of observational knowledge (Brandom, 2002b). If such a contribution is read against
the epistemological background just described in Section 1, arguably it is questionable both as an
interpretation of Sellars’s views and as a theory in itself.
Brandom’s reading begins with a demarcational interpretation of the space of reasons. Ac-
cording to his view, rational beings are essentially characterized (and therefore distinguishable
from non-rational beings) by their ability to play the game of giving and asking for reasons. The
idea is that concept users are not merely endowed with capacities to discriminate aspects of re-
ality and to classify them, but also with the ability to comply with the normative consequences
of doing so. Thus, Brandom notices, a chunk of iron classifies environments with respect to their
degree of humidity by exhibiting a differential response: it rusts in some and not in others. And
although it only provides a rough classification, it is reliable in doing so. Differential reliable re-
sponses do matter for concept use. In fact, as for humidity reports, we rely on hygrometers which
exhibit fine grained dispositions to differentially respond to the degree of water vapor in the air.
What an hygrometer can’t do, however, is using a report to make a move in a language game.
As Brandom puts it, for Sellars concept use is a linguistic affair: to understand the conceptual
content of a response is to understand its role in the web of inferential relations that are estab-
lished by the dynamics of the deontic statuses of those who take part in a discursive practice.
So, for instance, what makes of an observer’s report of “it’s humid here” an application of the
concept of humidity is the observer treating it as entailing something like “there’s water vapor
in the air” and as entailed by something like “I am a reliable reporter of humidity in standard
conditions and I reported ‘it’s humid’”. Part of what such a treating amounts to is providing
premises, when asked, as reasons to justify one’s commitment to the report “it’s humid here”.
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Traditional empiricism has always been fascinated by the possibility to connect concept use with
the reliable differential responsive dispositions that rational beings share with inanimate, non-
personal ones. But of course the temptation to think of an epistemic bridge between the realm of
nature and the realm of reasons that might directly provide with observational knowledge is part
of the mythology of the given. That is what the inferentialist is supposed to avoid by endorsing
the view that conceptual knowledge is inferentially articulated.
But now, observational reports begin to look problematic for the inferentialist. Consider the
following trivial example. I go for a walk on a misty evening in Pisa, I feel humid and I sponta-
neously claim “it’s humid”: do I know that it’s humid? Of course the inferentialist wants to say
that I do, but she can’t concede that my perceptual report per se expresses knowledge, for it is
elicited with no inferential justification. This is the explanatory difficulty that, according to Bran-
dom, Sellars solves by distinguishing two moments in observational reports: the non-inferential
dispositional response and its justification ex post facto. The idea would be that while certain
responses may actually be elicited as the manifestation of certain dispositions (i.e. not as a conse-
quence of an inferential process), these are truly to be treated as knowledge only when they come
to be justified by a reliability inference. Thus, in our example, it is only when the inference is in
effect drawn from “I am a reliable reporter of humid environments” and “I reported ‘it’s humid’”
to “it’s humid” that knowledge that it’s humid can be ascribed to me. In other words, it is only
when the inferential articulation of the concept of humidity is mastered that it can be applied to
make observational reports. The point is that the inferential justification might be provided even
after the dispositional response is elicited.
This account is completed by two collateral theses of Sellars’s. The first one is a story about
how observational concepts are learnt. Along the same lines as Wittgenstein, Sellars adopts a
methodologically behaviorist stance on this point. In this view, a child is first trained by concept
users to conform its differential responsive dispositions to the inferential rules that govern con-
cept applications: thus, for instance, she is trained to report “it’s humid” when she feels it. How
much does this process differ from the calibration of an hygrometer? At a very early stage not
much: both the child’s and the hygrometer’s performances are causally adjusted to the concept
use of the trainers/calibrators. But it changes dramatically when the child learns to respond to
the rules themselves as they are expressed in the rule-language of the trainers. At that point in
fact the child will be able to master the inferential articulation of the linguistic moves that she
has learned to unconsciously perform in certain ways, and thus, ultimately, to properly apply
concepts.
The second thesis is the acknowledgment that concepts with observational role can be learned,
just like theoretical ones, by learning the rules for their application. With respect to theoretical
concepts, whose application is governed only by rules for intra-linguistic moves, rules for obser-
vational concepts allow what Sellars called language-entry transitions. A language-entry transi-
tion entitles one to move to a linguistic position from a non-linguistic one. Thus, for instance, one
may apply the concept “red” to enter the linguistic practice with the observational report “that’s
red”. Of course, for that move to be really the application of a concept, one ought to be able to
inferentially justify the move by providing reasons for it, as e.g. “I am a reliable reporter of red
stuff and I reported ‘that’s red’”. In this sense the reporting role of observational concepts are
not mysterious from an inferentialist point of view. As a matter of fact, Sellars noticed, certain
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concepts that are initially introduced as theoretical may well later acquire reporting role and be-
come observational concepts. That is possible if their application comes to be governed by rules
for language-entry transition. Thus, for instance, physicists have recently begun to report the
observation of Higgs bosons after their existence had been postulated in the 1960s to explain in
the Standard Model how is it possible for other particles have mass.
Brandom ascribes this “two-ply” account of observation to Sellars, but is that accurate? There
is one main reason to doubt it, and it hinges on the understanding of the reporter’s mastering of
the inferential articulation of empirical concepts. As we have seen, in Sellars’s view, for the to-
kening of an observational report like “it’s humid” to have epistemic authority it must be placed
in the space of reasons, which, on the inferentialist reading, means for instance that it is correct
to infer from it that it’s humid. Of course the epistemic authority of the report comes with the
responsibility to give reasons for it. The problem with Brandom’s interpretation then has to do
with the role of the reliability inference that justifies the tokening of an observational report in
the space of reasons. In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars very explicitly requires that
the reporter himself must be able to draw such an inference (Sellars, 1956, §35). Brandom, on
the other hand, insists on the possibility that the reliability inference might be at someone else’s
disposal.
To a first approximation, Brandom’s misalignment with Sellars’s point of view could be put as
a difference between an externalist reliabilism and an internalist reliabilism (if there is any such
thing). Maybe that could help catching a glimpse of the problem from an epistemological point of
view. But it must be kept firmly in mind that Brandom’s analysis is mostly motivated by seman-
tic reasons.2 He ultimately aims to explain the content of the concepts applied in observational
judgments, and of course he aims to do that in terms of his normative inferentialism. On his
approach, the inferential relations that articulate conceptual contents are expressively grounded
on the normative relations that are established by the activities of discursive practitioners who
keep the score of each other’s deontic score. Practitioners are held responsible for their moves in
discursive practices, in the sense that they are treated as endorsing commitments to justify their
entitlement to their assertions. Such a responsibility is complied with by performing other asser-
tions. The set of commitments and entitlements endorsed by a discursive practitioner constitutes
her deontic score and the pragmatic significance of an assertion consists in its potential to alter
deontic scores. Thus an assertion, like an observational report, is construed as having content qua
having pragmatic significance. Since, however, deontic scores are kept by practitioners for each
other, they most likely will differ from one perspective to another. The idea that the determina-
tion of the articulation of conceptual content is a perspectival, social and historical process is part
and parcel of Brandom’s normative inferentialism.
Arguably, however, this is not Sellars’s view. He certainly maintains the thesis that linguistic
utterances have conceptual content not because they are reliably elicited by speakers nor because
they express their internal thoughts, but because they play certain roles in certain practices. This
however does not imply that such contents are determined by the interaction of different deontic
perspectives on linguistic performances. To the contrary, Sellars also holds that observational
reports possess first personal epistemic authority: the myth of genius Jones in the last part of
2As McDowell puts it: «Brandom thinks Sellars imposes his internalist requirement with a view to securing that the
reporter understands her reports [...] But its point is rather to secure that they have a specific kind of authority» (McDowell,
2002).
5
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is just intended to explain how that is not incompatible with
conceptual contents being acquired by engaging in linguistic practices. Sellars distinguishes in
fact the primacy in the order of being of episodes of experience from the primacy in the order of un-
derstanding of the inferential articulation of their contents, that can only be mastered as a conse-
quence of a proper training in linguistic practices. The latter semantic dependence of the content
of an episode of experience from the social practices in which concepts are learnt is not quite the
same thing as the second externalist step envisaged by Brandom in the process of application
of observational concepts where dispositionally elicited reports are inferentially justified ex post
facto.3 In effect, if Brandom’s analysis of experience is read at face value from an epistemological
point of view, the concern may be legitimately raised that it rules out epistemic first personal
authority in principle.
3 Experience and second nature
All those who take on the notion of the space of reasons in order to characterize knowledge
seem to be doomed to struggle against the dilemma between foundationalism and coherentism.
All but John McDowell. His analysis of the epistemological perplexities resulting from the di-
chotomy between the two logical spaces of nature and reasons is essentially the analysis of an
anxiety about the possibility of empirical knowledge that is in fact fostered by a blind-spot. In
the obfuscated picture, as McDowell describes it in the introduction of Mind and World (1994),
there are essentially two epistemological stances. The first one is a bald naturalism, that is com-
mitted to the rejection of the dichotomy between logical spaces and to the eliminativist program
of reducing rational episodes to natural ones. The second one is a compelled idealism, that ac-
cepts to discard the empiricist requests as the unavoidable consequence of rigorous epistemology
and commits to a coherentist picture according to which beliefs can only be justified by other be-
liefs. The attempt to accept the dichotomy and yet to bridge it, by postulating hybrid episodes or
justificatory relations, is the epistemological blunder engendered by the mythology of the given.
According to McDowell’s reading, the Sellarsian alternative is to «delineate a concept of impres-
sion that is insulated from epistemology» (ibi., p. xvii), i.e. to separate the dispositional occur-
rence of non-conceptual episodes in experience from their justificatory authority in the space of
reasons. These episodes thus play the transcendental role of constraining the activity of concept
application from the outside of the space of reasons. But McDowell considers the transcenden-
tal approach as an ultimately unsatisfactory answer, for it tries to look at the relations between
conceptual activity and its subject matter from sideways-on, where in fact, he argues wittgensteini-
anly, no such a standpoint is available. In McDowell’s view the transcendental perspective is the
price that Sellars accepts to pay in order to explain experience without commitment to neither
idealism nor the given. But it is not a price he is willing to pay himself, especially because he
sees he doesn’t have to. What he would see, and Sellars would not, is that conceptual capacities
that are spontaneously deployed in judgments are also passively activated in sensibility. This is
a lesson McDowell learns from Kant’s “Clue” for the transcendental deduction of pure concepts:
«[T]he same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives
unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition» (A79/B104-5). Hence, he
3On Brandom’s misunderstanding of Sellars on the report of episodes of experience see (McDowell, 2009c).
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extracts the idea that «if an ostensible seeing that. . . is a seeing that. . . , the very actualization of
conceptual capacities that accounts for its “containing” its claim also constitutes—at least if the
content of the claim deals with an ostensible object—its being an intuition in which an object is
immediately present to the subject» (McDowell, 2009a, p. 48).
Speaking of an “ostensible seeing” as “containing its claim”, McDowell is using the Sellarsian
jargon of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Ostensible seeings are episodes, as it were, of
putative visual experience: they are a superset of real seeings, which are episodes of veridical
visual experience. Thus while a seeing of a pink ice cube is an experience in which there is a pink
ice cube in front of one, an ostensible seeing of a pink ice cube is an experience in which it merely
looks to one that there is a pink ice cube in front of one. According to Sellars, however, any seeing
contains a claim in the sense that it “conveys” (Sellarsian jargon again) a content that could be
expressed by an observational judgment. Of course the idea can be generalized to any sensorial
episode.
McDowell, then, construes Kant as saying that if sensibility consists in the actualization of
the same conceptual capacities that are otherwise paradigmatically actualized in judgment, then
intuitions immediately provide with conceptually determined objects. Suppose, for instance,
that one is perceptually confronted with a pink ice cube. Then one has the intuition of a pink
ice cube. The content of such an intuition is the same as the content that could be expressed by
the observational judgment “Here is a pink ice cube”. This reasoning is often popularized as
the idea that the world is directly taken in in conceptual shape. In McDowell’s view this idea
is not only compatible with, but it is in fact the proper way to vindicate the minimal empiricist
requirement that empirical knowledge must answer to the tribunal of experience for its adequacy
to how things are in the world.
The problem with wrapping one’s mind around this approach is to understand in what sense
conceptual capacities might be actualized in sensibility, while granting the minimal empiricist
requirement and avoiding the myth of the given. The first point to get clear of is what it means for
an object to be conceptually determined. McDowell puts forward an example that is framed in a
Russellian understanding of conceptual articulation: the intuition whose content is “Here is a pink
ice cube” exhibits a different conceptual articulation with respect to the intuition whose content
is “Here are a pink plastic pyramid, a white ice sphere and a gray iron cube” (cp. McDowell,
2009a, pp. 10–11). So the idea is that the conceptual capacities (Funktionen) that synthesize such
a togetherness in an intuition are the same capacities that synthesize the same togetherness in a
judgment (ibid., p. 33).
The risk at this point, having acknowledged that an intuition is a conceptual representation
of an individual, a this, is to draw the distinction between judgment and sensibility on something
like the complexity of the categorial structure of the representation that they synthesize. In other
words, one might think that while a judgment that there is a pink ice cube in front of one is the
representation of a this as a pink ice cube, the intuition of a pink ice cube provides one with a
simple, a this-pink-ice-cube. This move is just what Sellars accuses Kant of doing in his Science and
Metaphysics (cp. Sellars, 1968, §§ 11–17). Of course the proto-conceptual notion of a this-such is a
blind alley: either one accepts it as epistemically authoritative, thus committing to the myth of the
given, or one renounces to use it to ground the justification of empirical judgments, thus giving
up on empiricism. McDowell, in effect, doesn’t share this criticism against Kant and insists on
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taking “the Clue” at face value: conceptual capacities are already fully at play in sensibility. On
his reading, the difference between sensibility and understanding lies just in the fact that while in
the latter conceptual capacities are spontaneously exercised, in the former they are only passively
active. When one judges, one is free to make up one’s mind about an object as one wishes.
When one intuits, one is necessitated by a perceived object. According to McDowell, the idea
that these processes pertain to capacities that must be explained on different logical spaces is the
consequence of a certain approach to scientific explanation according to which the realm of nature
coincides with what is made intelligible in terms of natural sciences. It should be acknowledged
instead that «we need not identify the dichotomy of logical spaces with a dichotomy between
the natural and the normative» (McDowell, 1994, p. xix). To use another slogan, human beings
also posses a second nature. This is the nature they acquire by partaking in linguistic practices
where they learn how to apply concepts: among the conceptual abilities that they acquire there
are those which are triggered in sensibility by the interaction with the world.
If one is willing to follow McDowell this far, one might be well convinced that his analysis of
empirical knowledge is sound and avoids the myth of the given. The hardest hurdle for him still
to clear, however, is to harmonize the idea that conceptual capacities are passively actualized in
intuition with the idea that empirical knowledge answers for correctness to how things are in the
world. In order to do that, to begin with, an account must be provided of perceptual mistakes.
According to McDowell, the content of an intuition is object-dependent, because intuitions are «im-
mediate sensible representation of objects» (McDowell, 2009a, p. 32). In an oft-quoted passage
he makes his point crystal clear:
In experience one takes in, for instance sees, that things are thus and so. (McDowell,
1994, p. 9)
As far as the problem of vindicating minimal empiricism is concerned, however, what follows is
more relevant:
Of course one can be misled into supposing that one takes in that things are thus
and so when things are not thus and so. But when one is not misled, one takes in how
things are. It does not matter much that one can be misled. (ibid.)
This last sentence has always given me a hard time, for it seems that the possibility to be misled
is just the whole point about perceptual mistake. As a first preliminary step, the temptation must
be resisted to picture McDowell’s proposal along the following lines: one’s episodes of experi-
ence are the result of the non-conceptual world causally activating one’s conceptual capacities.
This view, that McDowell attributes to Davidson and diagnoses as the root of the coherentist ap-
proach, sees the constraint that reality exerts on experience as external to the conceptual realm
and thus ultimately unaccessible to it. McDowell holds instead that the world is really in con-
ceptual shape and that the constraint it exerts on thought is internal to the conceptual realm. By
rehearsing Wittgenstein’s dictum that «[w]hen we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case,
we—and our meaning—do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this-is-so» (Wittgen-
stein, 1953, §95), he claims that when one is not misled, what one takes in in experience—that
things are thus and so—is just as such a fact, part of the world. As a second preliminary step,
the fear of idealism must be kept at bay. That is the anxiety that if reality is in conceptual shape
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and it does not exert an external constraint on thought, then the former would turn out to be
dependent on the latter. According to McDowell this accusation hinges on a confusion. Here,
as Sellars taught us, it’s decisive to acknowledge the ing/ed ambiguity of intentional terms: in
a sense, a thought is an act of thinking, in another different sense, a thought is the content of
such an act. Now, to say that reality does not exert external constraint on thinking is compatible
with saying that reality constrains thinking from within the realm of the contents of thought. In
other words, to claim that the world is in conceptual shape does not imply that it can’t properly
constrain conceptual activity.
Once these two points are put in place, the problem of perceptual mistake in McDowell’s ac-
count can be properly considered. Once again, his idea is that, when all goes well, if one has an
intuition, for instance, that there is a pink ice cube in front of one, then there is a pink ice cube
in front of one. Things go well when one is not misled, i.e. when one’s ostensible seeing is in
effect a seeing. But what if something goes wrong? Since there is nothing to mediate between
conceptual contents and objects, the only reasonable conclusion to draw is that to be under the
illusion of being perceptually confronted by a pink ice cube, as McDowell puts it, is to be under
an illusion «about the contents of one’s conceptually shaped consciousness» (McDowell, 2009a,
p. 49). But now, what does such an illusion amount to? It is important (and yet hard) here to
avoid any misunderstanding. In effect, philosophers have been traditionally puzzled by another
question about mistaken perceptions: what does one perceive when one has an illusion or hal-
lucinates? Of course, this is one of the sources that nourished the mythology of the given: sense
data theories, for instance, were designed just as a solution to this puzzlement. A tentatively
better answer might be: “nothing”. In the sense that in the case of mistaken perceptions one has
no real intuition at all, since one’s conceptual capacities have failed to be actualized. This is not
what McDowell has in mind however. An illusion about the contents of one conceptually shaped
consciousness is for him, in Kantian terms, an appearance of the sensible manifold being synthe-
sized into a representation. Let us suppose one is hallucinating a pink ice cube. In such a case,
one’s concepts of “pink”, “ice” and “cube” are activated. These concepts are the same as those
that are activated both in the judgment “here is a pink ice cube” and in the intuition of a pink ice
cube. However, while in these cases the concepts are activated with a certain «“logical” together-
ness» (ibid.), in the case of hallucination the togetherness of the representation is merely apparent
because there is no object with such a togetherness. In this sense McDowell accepts that seeings
and ostensible seeings may share the activation of certain conceptual capacities, but denies that
they are the same sort of internal episode of experience. Still, this view is often characterized as a
form of epistemological disjunctivism. As an account of perceptual mistake, it must be acknowl-
edged that it implies the mind-independency of the objects of experience and that it is essentially
compatible with the demands of minimal empiricism.
4 McDowell’s criticism against inferentialism
Is McDowell’s theory of empirical knowledge sound, or is it just an overeager attempt to have
the cake and eat it? I do not intend to put forward any answer to questions of this sort, nor
my purpose in this paper is to evaluate McDowell’s theory. I would be content with having
presented it correctly and clearly enough in such a short space. Indeed, for the sake of the argu-
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ment I will assume that it is correct and take up the challenge that it poses to the inferentialist.
It’s worth being clear, however, that McDowell intends to raise no challenge at all: instead, he
argues explicitly against normative inferentialism. In order to properly present the paradox of
inferentialism, McDowell’s criticism must be rehearsed. The main points of his dissatisfaction
with Brandom’s approach are presented in a diptych of essays directly addressed to Brandom
and conveniently collected in the volume The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays (2009b).
One of these, Motivating Inferentialism (2005), is purported to show that, whatever the merits
of inferentialism may be, Brandom fails to provide really convincing reasons to adopt it. McDow-
ell’s argument consists in what looks like a lethal combination of hits: (i) Brandom advertises in-
ferentialism as the reversal of the representationalist tradition according to which designational
relations have explanatory priority over inferential ones, but such a tradition is in effect a chorus
of straw men; (ii) although inference might have explanatory priority over designation, it has no
priority over representation; (iii) scorekeeping practices, as Brandom describes them in deontic
terms, are not sufficient to ground inferential relations; (iv) the authors, like Sellars and Frege, to
whom Brandom ascribes inferentialist theses in the attempt to retrace an alternative inferentialist
tradition in the history of philosophy, do not really maintain them; (v) although logical vocabu-
laries make explicit the inferential properties of linguistic expressions as contents in the space of
reasons, these properties depend on expressions having semantic content beforehand; (vi) Bran-
dom fails to cash out the alleged virtues of inferentialism into a substantial semantic account of a
whole language in inferentialist terms.
The climactic series (i)–(iii) is particularly illuminating with respect to McDowell’s view on
inferentialism. He begins by highlighting a problematic argumentative strategy on Brandom’s
part. Brandom presents the contrast between representationalism and inferentialism as consist-
ing in the choice of their primitive semantic notion: representationalists take designation as a
primitive and try to explain inference in terms of it, inferentialists to the contrary take inference
as a primitive and try to explain designation in terms of it. Yet, he argues, the inferentialist
approach is more promising. On the one hand, as Ryle, Wittgenstein and Sellars have noticed
(among many others), a semantics based on the name-bearer relation makes it mysterious that
linguistic expressions may have meanings. On the other hand, a pragmatic story could be told
about how the notion of inference is grounded in a deontic analysis of social discursive practices.
Therefore, Brandom contends, inferentialism is worth at least giving a chance. McDowell pro-
ceeds to demolish this reasoning. He (i) insists that the idea that the name-bearer relation is to be
taken as a primitive in semantics is in no sense representative of representationalism. This may
sound weird: after all designation, as it is realized in the function of interpretation, is a primitive
in model theory and model-theoretic semantics is a representationalist theory, and of course it is
the standard approach in semantic theory. Still, what is required for Brandom’s argument to hit
the target is that the relation of designation characterize the theoretical core of representational-
ism rather than the technical core of model-theory. In other words, the question is whether any
representationalist would agree that what it is for any linguistic expression to have meaning is
to be the name of something. And this, of course, is different from saying that the meaning of
any linguistic expression can be theoretically represented by something for which it stands for
in a model. Representationalists, McDowell claims, just purport to explain how expressions are
meaningful in terms of a notion of representation. That in effect is what model-theoretic seman-
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tics tries to capture in terms of the formalization of a correspondentistic notion of truth. So even
if designational relations could be defined in terms of inferential ones, that would be no reason
to favor inferentialism over representationalism.
But maybe the notion of representation itself could be defined in term of inference. McDowell
(ii) denies that. What McDowell has in mind as a paradigm of a use of expressions with rep-
resentational purport is judging: «representing that things are thus and so in the way one does
when one asserts that things are thus and so» (ibid., p. 114). He concedes for the argument’s sake
that Brandom might be right in maintaining that representational locutions, like ‘that’-clauses,
could be introduced as explicitating devices in a discursive practices in which speakers already
master inferential relations. Yet he points out that those representational locutions are not the
same things as judgments, if only because they can’t be used by themselves to make a judgment,
an assertion, a language move. Besides, according to Brandom himself, asserting and inferring
are not intelligible the one apart from the other.
This simply cuts the whole point about the choice of semantic primitives loose. In a sense,
however, it enhances the role of Brandom’s normative pragmatics, which is purported to explain
how inferential relations are grounded in discursive practices: if Brandom were successful with
that, he would in effect secure, both from an inferentialist and from a representationalist point of
view, the connection between semantic significance and pragmatic significance that is encapsu-
lated in his slogan “semantics must answer pragmatics”. McDowell himself recognizes that:
Perhaps the more we should extract from Brandom’s acknowledgment that infer-
ring is not prior to asserting is that “inferentialism” is, after all, not a good label for
the position he means to recommend. What he really wants us to see as a primitive
is the idea of a deontic structure of commitments and entitlements with rationality
consequential relations between them (ibid., p. 115).
In effect, his criticism of Brandom’s approach in this paper mainly hinges on this point (iii)—subsequent
points (iv)–(vi) being essentially corollaries and collateral remarks. It is also worth remarking
that, in this sense, the criticism doesn’t really addresses inferentialism as a semantic theory per se,
but the possibility to satisfactorily account for conceptual content in the socio-deontic terms on
which Brandom bases his normative approach to inferentialism. So, the question is whether the
“deontic structure of commitments and entitlements with rationality consequential relations be-
tween them” that Brandom describes essentially involves conceptual contents. McDowell denies
that. He contends that a practice whose characterization is exhausted by such a deontic structure
may well be just a game, in which moves are normatively determined and still devoid of content.
Brandom’s own response against this proposition consists in rehearsing his expressivist project
in Making it Explicit and compiling the list of the expressions whose role he managed to recon-
struct in the second part of the book as making explicit features of the discursive practices that he
analyzes in the first part: logical connectives, normative vocabulary, semantic vocabulary, singu-
lar terms and predicates, etc. Brandom’s view is that since no one doubts that these expressions
have conceptual content and they are shown in Making it Explicit to express features of normative
discursive practices (which McDowell acknowledges), then the idea that these practices do not
involve conceptual contents must be wrong (Brandom, 2008b). This however doesn’t sound like
a satisfactory answer to McDowell’s concern. In fact it might be insisted that the reason why the
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linguistic expression that are shown to express features of the discursive practices have concep-
tual contents is because discursive practices do involve conceptual contents, except Brandom’s
socio-deontic characterization is not sufficient to provide them with it.
My impression is that in his answer Brandom is intentionally refusing to acknowledge the
difference between his and McDowell’s notion of conceptual content. In fact, while they both
endorse Sellars’s normative characterization of conceptual content as what is trafficked in the
space of reasons, they differ in the interpretation of his functionalism. To the contrary of Bran-
dom, McDowell believes that a purely functional definition of conceptual content falls short of
providing a characterization of its being about how things are in the world. This is why he says
that in Brandom’s socio-deontic practices it may be not the case «that the behavior has meaning,
except in the sense in which, say, chess moves have meaning» (McDowell, 2005, p. 115). In fact,
in McDowell’s view chess moves have no meaning because they are not related to the extra-chess
world.
It’s worth recalling here Sellars’s non-relational analysis of meaning statements like “. . . means
. . . ” or “. . . stands for . . . ”. In the standard Tarskian account these are metalinguistic statements
of relations between an expression in the object language on the left-hand side and the object re-
ferred to by the metalinguistic expression on the right-hand side. Sellars construes instead what
stands on the right as the peculiar use of a linguistic expression as an illustrative sample exhibit-
ing the role that the sampled sort of expressions play in the metalanguage. He typographically
singles out such a use by employing dot-quotes: thus, for instance “•cat•” is interpreted as a
distributive singular term referring to the expressions that in any given language play the role
that “cat” plays in English. The role an expression plays in a language can be functionally deter-
mined with respect to the relations it stands to other expressions. These relations in Brandom’s
normative inferentialism are established by the normative attitudes that discursive practitioners
adopt towards each other’s linguistic performances and can be represented in terms of inferential
relations. In this sense, “«gatto» stands for cat” is to be analyzed as saying that “gatto”, in Ital-
ian, plays the same role “cat” plays in English. In this sense, again, semantic statements are not
relational statements at all: they do not relate expressions to things in the world. To the contrary,
they are specialized copular statements, signaling practical properties of use of expressions: thus,
for instance, that “gatto” is a •cat•. Of course in this sense, chess moves do have meaning: the
very same sort of meaning that language moves have.
In the third of his Woodbridge Lectures, Intentionality as a Relation, McDowell directly tackles
this Sellarsian non-relational reading of semantic analysis:
How can a statement that relates an expression only to another expression serve to
determine an intentional character associated with the first expression, a role it plays
in enabling linguistic acts it occurs in to be determinately directed towards elements
in the extra-linguistic reality? (McDowell, 1998a, p. 478)
McDowell can’t accept a non-relational analysis of intentionality: to him, it would be like spoil-
ing good epistemology with bad semantics. In fact the authority of the outer world, to which
conceptual contents must answer for their objectivity, is seriously at risk to get lost if contents
are treated to be related only with each other. From this point of view, Sellars’s transcendental
and Brandom’s socio-historical perspectives are just frantic strategies to put objectivity back in
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the picture.
If my recollection is correct, this first part of McDowell’s criticism to Brandom’s semantic
approach is essentially directed against his strategy to ground conceptual contents on normative
discursive practices and to treat intentionality as an expressive side-product of their socio-deontic
dynamics. In this sense, however, it does not amount to a rejection much of inferentialism qua
semantic theory as of Brandom’s socio-deontic analysis of conceptual content. Of course the two
are deeply intertwined in Brandom’s normative inferentialism, but still it is important to mark off
precisely the point that McDowell addresses. Semantic analysis is concerned only to the extent
that it might support (or at least suggest) wrong approaches to epistemological questions. In
this sense, the problem is particularly acute in the case of observational content: here semantic
analysis must be consistent with a solution to the epistemological problem of experience, which
consists in explaining how we take in how things are.
5 Externalism and default entitlement
No doubt representationalism fits McDowell’s account of conceptual content and his concern
with the epistemological problem of experience better than inferentialism. It is important to ac-
knowledge, however, that McDowell does not burden the representationalist semantic analysis
with any explanatory task in epistemology. He does not intend the interpretation function to
ground an expression’s content into what it stands for in the world. That would be a rather
twisted exploitation of representational semantics on his part. In model-theoretic semantics, rep-
resentational relations only make explicit the content of linguistic expressions. The same applies
to inferentialist semantics: inferential relations do not ground an expression’s content into any-
thing linguistic or non-linguistic, they only make explicit the content of linguistic expressions.
The reason why this point is worth remarking is that it helps to avoid a certain misunder-
standing of the paradox of inferentialism we will deal with. Recall that the paradox presented
by McDowell consists in the claim that the conceptual content of an observational judgement is
not inferentially related to anything but itself. It would be a mistake to read this as the one horn
of a dilemma that the inferentialist would be forced to face: either to recognize that inference
does not play any substantial role in the semantic analysis of empirical content or to concede that
empirical content may receive inferential justification from the empirical realm. Of course the
latter option is just off the table for anyone who is enough aware of the pitfalls of the myth of
the given, while the former amounts to a debacle of the inferentialist project. But the two horns
of such dilemma pertain in effect to different problems about empirical content: on the one hand
there’s the semantic problem of defining the content of observational judgments, on the other
hand there is the epistemological problem of grounding an observational judgment’s content on
what in the world exerts the authority on which its justification must be adjudicated. In fact, the
inferentialist is in no sense committed to inference being an epistemological bridge. Just like the
representationalist is not committed to representation being any such bridge.
This preamble on the distinction between semantic and epistemological problems of experi-
ence is useful as an introduction to the analysis of a second substantial part of McDowell’s criti-
cism of inferentialism, in which the risk to confuse the two planes is quite high. The theses that
I want to consider are contained in McDowell’s Knowledge and the Internal Revisited (McDowell,
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2002), which is basically just a rejoinder to Brandom’s comments on his original paper (Brandom,
1995; McDowell, 1995). There, he deals with the proper place of Sellars’s normative characteriza-
tion of knowledge along the axis of the debate between internalism and externalism. According
to Sellars episodes of knowing belong to the space of reasons, in the sense that the notion of
knowledge is a normative notion, the deployment of which introduces a framework in which
episodes are properly treated as requiring justifications rather than empirical descriptions. But
what does a justification amount to? In this regard, it is expedient to keep in mind the traditional
platonic definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). On the internalism-externalism axis
just like on the coherentism-foundationalism one, the notion of the space of reasons seems to in-
troduce a dilemma. On the one horn there’s a purely internalist account of empirical knowledge
in which justifications spin in the empirical void. Such sort of internalism fails to vindicate the
factivity of knowledge: if the content p is known, then it must be true.4 On the other horn, a stark
externalist stance according to which, for instance, the justification for one knowing that there is
a pink ice cube in front of one is the empirical fact that there is a pink ice cube in front of one.
Such sort of externalism seems to opt out of the very idea of the space of reasons. According to
McDowell, however, the dilemma is the result of an unquestioned dualistic proclivity to internal-
ize the space of reasons and to believe that it is in some sense autonomous and detached from the
outer world. This approach obfuscates the commonsensical truth that «[t]he entitlement consists
in the visual availability to her of the fact she would affirm in making that claim» (McDowell,
2002, p. 98). And thus it makes it mysterious how one can be entitled to justify one’s perceptual
knowledge that there is a pink ice cube in front of one by claiming “I see that there is a pink ice
cube in front of me”.
When confronted with this picture, on his part, Brandom tries to supply an externalist alter-
native to the internalization of the space of reasons by mobilizing his social account of discursive
practices:
[C]ognitive locutions such as “knows”, which include both factive and warrantive
dimensions, can all be understood as standings in a socially articulated space of rea-
sons: standings that incorporate what are with respect to individual knowers internal
and external epistemic considerations in the form of the distinct social perspectives of
attributing and undertaking commitments. (Brandom, 1995, p. 907)
His way to cash out JTB requirements is in terms of his analysis of the speakers’ normative sta-
tuses in linguistic practices. So, in his view, for S to believe that p is for S to be committed to the
content that p, and for S to be justified in believing that p is for S to be entitled to the content
that p. Of course the crux of the analysis concerns the truth requirement. According to Brandom,
for S to believe truly that p is for S’s interpreter to be committed to p herself. Here is where, with
the introduction of a second perspective, the social dimension comes directly to the fore. But it is
important to acknowledge that the whole analysis is essentially social: the score of commitments
and entitlements that constitute deontic statuses is reciprocally kept by discursive practitioners.
So to sum up, according to Brandom, the content of a knowledge attribution like “S knows that
p” on the part of an interpreter of S is fully unpacked into three parts: (i) the interpreter attributes
4The contrapositive is, to a certain extent, clearer a statement of the principle to grasp: nothing false can be known.
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to S the commitment to p, (ii) the interpreter attributes to S the entitlement to p and (iii) the inter-
preter acknowledges herself the commitment to p.
McDowell (2002) protests against this deployment of social perspectives in order to charac-
terize epistemic entitlement. First, in his view, Brandom’s attempt to fulfill the JTB requirements
through the interplay between a knower and an interpreter shares just the internalizing procliv-
ity that he criticized in the first place, to the extent that Brandom doesn’t conceive the knower’s
entitlement (ii) to be sufficient to guarantee truth (iii) and advocates for the necessity of a medi-
ating element, provided by the interpreter’s commitment, that is not at the knower’s disposal.
Second, on Brandom’s analysis entitlement (ii) is also externalized on the social framework, in
the sense that it is attributed to the knower by a scorekeeper. This, as Brandom puts it, allows
for the possibility of being justified while not being able to justify. As we have seen in Section 2,
Brandom explicitly admits that an episode may be one of knowledge even if the knower herself is
not able to draw the inferences that would justify her knowledge, provided that such inferences
can be drawn by the interpreter who keeps her score.
Patently, the whole discussion gravitates around the interpretation of the notion of entitle-
ment. While both Brandom and McDowell recognize that a knower’s entitlement does not de-
pend only on herself, they disagree about the status a knower acquires by being entitled to her
beliefs. On Brandom’s view entitlement is essentially perspectival (even when it is ascribed to
oneself), therefore it does not guarantee per se the objectivity of the correctness of concept appli-
cation. McDowell considers such a defeasible entitlement as no entitlement at all, just because
it does not provide objective justification. The distinction between a semantic and an epistemo-
logical problem of experience, however, allows to contemplate the possibility that they might be
both right. Brandom’s notion of entitlement is essentially semantic: according to his pragmatic
analysis of discursive practices, entitlements and commitments constitute the attitude-dependent
normative statuses that are established by discursive practitioners and that define the pragmatic
content of the linguistic expressions they deploy. McDowell’s notion of entitlement is thoroughly
epistemic: it characterizes the status of being justified in entertaining empirical knowledge.5 Let
me try to shed some light on the point by means of an example.
Let us consider a certain John (maybe a necktie seller) who is at the shooting range shooting
clay pigeons. For the sake of the example let’s consider “to shoot” as a resultative verb, just like
“to see”: in a episode of shooting something is shot down. Now, suppose also that John is quite
good at shooting clay pigeons, and yet sometimes he fails. When he misses the clay pigeon, his
shooting capacities fail, they are not actualized: the clay pigeon is not shot down. In Sellars’s
deceptive jargon, in that case the shooting would be just an ostensible shooting. In fact, there is
no shooting at all. Similarly, McDowell’s disjunctivism suggests that a case of mere ostensible
seeing is no seeing at all, in the sense that the conceptual capacities that would be actualized in
an episode of seeing to return empirical knowledge of what is seen are not in fact actualized in
the same way in a case of perceptual mistake.
Let us suppose now that John is back at the shooting range on a windy day. Unbeknownst to
5Of course there is no misunderstanding on this point on these authors’ part: they know what they are doing just
too well. Brandom is pushing the idea that epistemological problems have a “soft underbelly” to be accounted for (cp.
Brandom, 2002a, p. 23). In fact, his story about the objectivity of conceptual content has to be found not in his two-ply
account of observational reports, but in his analysis of German idealism. McDowell instead, in his debate with Brandom,
is trying precisely not to be enrolled in his Hegelian ranks (cp. McDowell, 2002, 98).
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him the range operator substitutes clay pigeons with real ones, which however happen to fly just
on the same trajectory of the clays. Then, when John performs his shooting, he shoots down the
poor animals. How can he do that? Is his ability to shoot clay pigeons the same as his ability to
shoot real ones, just like his ability to shoot green clay pigeons is the same as his ability to shoot
orange ones? Let now the cruel man be caught and get what he deserves. Clay pigeons are put
back in their places and John goes for his shootings again. He now misses almost every time.
Let us suppose that in fact clay pigeons, as opposed to real ones, fly with a certain spin which
interacts in certain ways with the wind, thus producing certain modifications in their trajectories.
John doesn’t know how to deal with that and he misses clay pigeons in windy conditions. In a
sense, it would be correct to say that John doesn’t really have the capacity to shoot clay pigeons.
Which capacity does he have then? 6
Again, this is not a ballistic (or, mutatis mutandis, an epistemological) problem, but a semantic
one. It is not a problem that McDowell doesn’t see, but it is one that he is not really concerned
with. As he makes clear in plenty of occasions, he is committed to the idea that the possession
of conceptual capacities is acquired by being taught to take part in the social practices in which
those capacities are exerted and concepts applied (cp. McDowell, 2002, pp. 104–105). He just
doesn’t see how this could provide any answer to the epistemological problem of experience he is
concerned with.7 Still, the problem of the determination of conceptual contents is an interesting
one. As far as concept-use is concerned, representationalism tends to harmonize with the Car-
napian two-step analysis famously criticized by Quine: first concepts are grasped and then they
are applied. In such a picture the problem of how conceptual contents are determined is clearly
distinguished from the problem of whether they are applied correctly. To the contrary, inferen-
tialism, at least in Brandom’s normative version, runs together the processes of determination
and application of conceptual contents. The latter are established by the normative attitudes
that discursive practitioners take towards each other with respect to their moves. Of course, se-
mantic analysis is to be understood as representing the conditions for the correct application of
conceptual contents. This must be true for both representationalism and inferentialism. Yet, in
normative inferentialism, since conceptual contents are attitude-dependent, one’s entitlement to
the application of a conceptual content is intrinsically defeasible. Moreover, since conceptual con-
tents are represented in functional terms as roles in the web of inferential relations that express
the normative relations established by discursive practitioners, there is a clear way to account for
such a defeasibility directly on the semantic plan in terms of defeasible inferences.
6Of course it’s easy to adapt the example to the case of empirical knowledge. In fact, Sellars’s original example of
the tie shop in section III of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind would do the job just as well. The reason why I didn’t
pick an epistemic example in the first place is because it might have suggested that this point should count somehow
against McDowell’s theory of experience. It does not. In the case of shooting clay pigeons there are some capacities that
are actualized and many others that are not. An episode of shooting clay pigeons in which a clay pigeon is not shot down
is not, in fact, an episode of shooting clay pigeons, just like an episode of seeing a pink ice cube in which a pink ice cube
is not taken in in perceptual experience is not an episode of seeing. Hence, there is no question that John can justify the
fact that he shot down a clay pidgeon by claiming that “I shot a clay pigeon”. The point of the example is rather to raise
a different sort of question, a question about the determination of the episode’s content.
7The failure to distinguish between these two sorts of problems may engender the misunderstanding that the debate
between Brandom and McDowell on experience is to be construed as hinging on the distinction between a social and an
individualistic approach. In effect, Brandom explicitly charges McDowell of individualism (Brandom, 1995, pp. 904–908).
But again his concern is mostly semantic, along the lines of Wittgenstein’s objection to the idea of a private language: he
accuses McDowell of individualizing the space of reasons and transforming it into something private, impervious to
the normative analysis of conceptual content that he endorses. McDowell, on his part, is concerned instead with the
epistemological entitlement of a concept user to empirical knowledge.
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6 A few logical remarks on defeasibility
As we have seen, in McDowell’s view the justificatory role of an observational report can only
be played by the fact it reports. But the justification a fact provides is not of the inferential sort.
The content of an observational report is inferentially related to nothing: the only sense in which
inferential relations could come into play in this picture is by connecting the content with itself.
Let’s now assume for the sake of the argument that McDowell’s account of empirical content is
correct. That implies that Brandom’s two-ply account has to be rejected as a rival epistemological
explanation. However, this is actually a relatively cheap move from an inferentialist perspective,
since McDowell’s theory is not really much committing on the semantic side. Let us now look
back at the paradox of inferentialism pinpointed by McDowell from the point of view of the
semantic problem of experience. Recall that the paradox amounts to the remark that the only
content in virtue of which an observational judgment has its standing in the space of reason is
the content of the judgment itself, so that the only inference involved in its determination would
be:
p, therefore p
To begin with, I would say that rather than a “stuttering” form of inference, this is a quite
respectable instance of the identity axiom. No matter how trivial it might sound, in many calculi
this is necessary to define the deducibility relation that is intended to be formalized. Let us ask
however how trivial it actually is from the inferentialist perspective.
In effect, logicians know that in the neighborhood of the identity axiom lies another sort of
paradoxes. These affect the classical formalization of the conditionals in terms of material im-
plication. A formula whose principal connective is a material implication, φ → ψ, is true for
any combination of the truth values of the component formulas, φ and ψ, except in the case in
which the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Of course, this semantic definition of
the implication connective validates the identity axiom, but it also validates more controversial
formulas, as for example φ → ψ → φ or ψ → φ → φ. The reason why some logicians view these
as problematic is that they don’t seem to express any interesting relation of entailment between
the premisses and the conclusions.8 To accept them is to accept the following arguments, for
instance, as valid:
If there is a pink ice cube in front of one, then if McDowell is the author of Making it
Explicit then there is a pink ice cube in front of one.
If Brandom lives in Pisa, then if there is a pink ice cube in front of one then there is a
pink ice cube in front of one.
These formulas are known as “paradoxes of material implication”, and the problem they raise is
quite distinct from the paradox of inferentialism that we are considering. Nonetheless there are
some interesting relations between them that can be highlighted by looking at how the paradoxes
of material implication are generated from a proof-theoretical point of view.
It is common for a proof system to have a deduction theorem that relates its deduction relation
with a connective of implication. Thus, let a proof system P be a couple 〈Fm,`〉, where Fm is a set
8As it is well known, this approach to the analysis of implication and entailment was pioneered by C.I. Lewis and led
to the modern systems of modal logics. Later, the same vein has been exploited to develop relevant logics. For a locus
classicus of the discussion on the paradoxes of implication see (Anderson and Belnap, 1975), in particular §1.1 and §5.1.
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of well formed formulas of a given language L (containing a connective “→”) and `⊆ Fm× Fm
a relation on Fm. Let also Γ,∆ be sets of formulas in Fm, and φ,ψ,χ be formulas in Fm. Then the
deduction theorem for P can be expressed as follows:
Deduction Theorem. Γ, φ ` ψ iff Γ ` φ→ ψ
The deduction theorem essentially states that relations of deduction among formulas in Fm can
be made explicit as implicative formulas. And viceversa.
Classical proof systems also have another interesting property that characterizes monotonic
reasoning:
Monotonicity. If Γ ` φ and Γ ⊆ ∆, then ∆ ` φ
Monotonicity states that if a relation of deduction is valid, the addition of extra premisses does
not invalidate it.
Clearly, these properties together with the identity axiom generate the paradoxes of implica-
tion:
(1) ` φ→ φ Ax.
(2) φ ` φ 1, Ded. Th.
(3) ψ, φ ` φ 2, Mon.
(4) φ ` ψ→ φ 3, Ded. Th.
(5) ` φ→ ψ→ φ 4, Ded. Th.
Similarly, for ψ→ φ→ φ by applying commutativity in the premisses of the deduction relation.
Among the ingredients blent together here, the most obvious suspect for spoiling the recipe is
monotonicity. In effect, with the exception of certain highly specialized fields like mathematics,
monotonic reasoning is anything but evidently sound. Our everyday reasoning is essentially
non-monotonic: adding premisses does make a huge difference as for the validity of an inference.
Just to stick to our examples, consider:
If John shoots a clay pigeon, then a clay pigeon is shot down.
If John shoots a clay pigeon on a windy day, then a clay pigeon is shot down.
Nothing seems to guarantee that if the first inference is valid, then the second one must be valid
too. To the contrary, our previous example just shows a case in which the former is valid and the
latter fails. In order to cope with these intuitions, proof systems have been developed that lack
the property of monotonicity.9
There is however another less noticeable responsible for the derivation of the paradoxes of
implication from the axiom of identity. In effect, it is somehow hidden in the deduction theorem
9Non-monotonic logics are a wide and varied family, for failure of monotonicity can be obtained in a number of
ways. Relevant logics for instance are in a sense non-monotonic since they reject the rule of weakening (or thinning):
Γ ` ∆⇒ φ, Γ ` ∆. This is known as a structural rule of Gentzen’s sequent calculus for classical logic LK and intuitionistic
logic LJ. Systems that reject any of the structural rules are known as substructural logics. In this sense relevant logics can be
construed as substructural logics. There are other substructural logics that reject weakening, like linear logic or Lambek
calculus. These are non-monotonic in the same sense as relevance logic. For a presentation of substructural logics see
(Restall, 2000). All these logics are contained in classical logic in the sense that any substructural consequence of a set of
formulas is also a classical consequence, but not viceversa. However, non-monotonicity has been thoroughly explored also
in another direction, by weakening the Tarskian properties of the classical consequence relation and obtaining relations
that extend the set of consequences that can be drawn from a set of formulas beyond classically valid ones. In this sense,
these non-monotonic logics are said supraclassical. For a comprehensive review of non-monotonic supra-classical logics
see (Makinson, 2005).
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and it takes some algebraic elaboration to bring it into plain view. Let A = 〈A,≤〉 be the Linden-
baum Algebra determined by the set of theorems of the system P. In algebraic semantics it is usual
to interpret entailment in terms of the ordering relation “≤”. Thus, if the deduction theorem is
valid for P, it is easy to show that A has the following property of residuation:10
Right Residuation. φ ∧ ψ ≤ χ iff ψ ≤ φ→ χ
Residuation shows that there is an interesting relation in A between the algebraic operators that
interpret conjunction and implication. In algebra, “φ→ χ” is called the right residual of χ by φ: it
can be thought as what remains of χ after “→-ing” it by φ.11 In algebraic semantics it is common
to think of implication as a right residual because this guarantees certain basic properties. In fact,
it follows from Right Residuation that
φ ∧ φ→ χ ≤ χ
The conjunction of two formulas φ and ψ instead is usually represented as the greatest lower
bound of their interpretants, i.e. the greatest x ∈ A such that x ≤ φ and x ≤ ψ. That also makes
some standard properties of conjunction valid, such as:
if Γ ` φ and Γ ` ψ then Γ ` φ ∧ ψ
if Γ ` φ ∧ ψ then Γ ` φ and Γ ` ψ
Let us ask now what would happen if the operator right-residuated by implication does not
represent conjunction. Let us suppose in other words that there is another binary logical oper-
ator that binds premises together and that is related to implication in the way residuation laws
prescribe, but doesn’t behave like conjunction.12 Let us call it fusion and let us denote it by “◦”.
So, conjunction and fusion are two ways to take contents together and are differently related
with implication and inferential relations:13 from an inferentialist point of view this means that
they make explicit two different ways to define inferential roles and thus ultimately conceptual
contents. The interaction of these two inferential perspectives may well produce defeasible in-
ferences. A good way to see how that happens is to consider a four-valued algebraic semantics
for a logic that contains such two inferential perspectives. Thus, consider the following Hasse
diagram:
10In the following, members of A and the operators defined on them will be indicated with the same notation as the
formulas of Fm and the operators in the system P that they interpret.
11In the algebra of arithmetics, for instance, where conjunction is multiplication, the residual is what remains of χ after
dividing it by φ: in fact, φ× ψ = χ iff ψ = χ\φ.
12A similar strategy has been applied for relevant logics: see (Dunn, 1973; Mints, 1976).
13A right residual for conjunction might be added as well to complete the picture, but that does not really add anything





The algebraic structure pictured in Figure 1 is a bilattice B.14 A bilattice can be seen as a
doubly partially ordered set, thusB = 〈B,≤1,≤2〉. In this sense,B can be read as follows: nodes
are ordered from bottom to top according to≤1 and from left to right according to≤2. Intuitively,
a bilattice-based algebraic semantics is just suitable to represent a logic in which two inferential
perspectives interact. Let us consider B as representing the algebra of a four valued semantics
for such a logic. Let ≤1 represent the inferential perspective determined by conjunction, and ≤2
the inferential perspective determined by fusion: in more formal terms, given thatB is a bilattice,
for any x, y ∈ B let
x ≤1 y iff x ∧ y = x
x ≤2 y iff x ◦ y = x
Let the algebraic equivalent of conjunction and fusion be both greatest lower bounds with respect
to their order. Thus, for example, 0∧ 1 = F and T ◦ F = 0. That is easy to read off from Figure 1.
This algebraic semantics allows to see what happens when reasoning is performed while two
inferential perspectives interact. Let us define again, standardly, entailment in terms of the or-
dering relation ≤1, and let us consider, for instance, just the paradoxes of material material im-
plication. Recall that the problematic steps are (i) the move from φ ` φ to ψ, φ ` φ and then
(ii) the move to φ ` ψ → φ. First consider move (ii). For it to be valid in the present semantics
the coma that takes premises together on the left of the turnstile can’t be interpreted in terms of
conjunction. In fact we have stipulated that implication is the right residual of fusion. But then
move (i) turns out to be problematic. In fact, while φ ∧ ψ ≤1 φ is always valid, φ ◦ ψ ≤1 φ could
fail. For a counterexample just consider the case in which φ is F and ψ is T: then φ ◦ ψ is 0, and 0
is greater than F.
At this point it is worth pausing to sum up the line of thought pursued in this section. These
brief remarks are intended to suggest that if the notion of defeasible entitlement is considered
from a logical point of view, it unveils a number of deep and interesting questions about the
structure of the inferential relations that are involved in defeasible reasoning. A paradigmatic
example of this sort of reasoning is just empirical reasoning. In this sense, the paradoxical ring
resonating around McDowell’s analysis of the inferentialist account of the content of observa-
tional judgments is illusory. In fact, even an apparently trivial principle like the identity axiom
may have profound consequences in the inferential behavior of the different systems to which it
may belong. These consequences are of the utmost importance to the inferentialist, because they
dramatically affect the inferential relations that are construed as defining conceptual contents.
14The study of bilattices in algebraic semantics was originally introduced by Ginsberg (1988) and later developed and
systematized in (Fitting, 1990; Avron, 1996).
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In particular, the role of non-monotonicity has to be reconsidered when a semantic approach is
adopted.
7 Defeasibility and the articulation of conceptual content
Non-monotonic inferences are clearly defeasible, but there are several ways to construe their
defeasibility. In an epistemological sense, defeasibility is usually explained in terms of partial
information. Thus, non-monotonic inferences are construed as representing reasoning from a
somehow epistemically defective knowledge base, so that the addition of new information may
not only allow for new inferences to be drawn, but also invalidate inferences drawn before. The
inferentialist, however, may also read defeasibility in a semantic sense. If contents are defined as
inferential roles then defeasible inferences determine contents that vary dynamically by interact-
ing with other contents in different contexts. It is important to acknowledge that in this reading
what varies is not the definition of conceptual contents, but the contents themselves. From a
technical point of view, the main difference between the epistemological and the semantic in-
terpretation concerns the account of the defeased inference. Notice that, for an inference to be
defeased, it must had been valid in some context. So, for instance, the inference “If John shoots
a clay pigeon, a clay pigeon is shot down” is valid in the context in which it is originally drawn.
Such a context does not include the content that results from the combination of the content “John
shoots a clay pigeon” and the content “it’s a windy day”. In fact a context that contains such a
combination invalidates the inference. Of course there are a lot of ways in which these intuitive
notions of context and combination of contents can be formalized, but in general an inference
can be said to be defeasible in this sense if it is valid in some but not in every context. An infer-
ence being defeased in a given context does not tell against the validity of the inference in other
contexts.
Things change if contexts are organized into some preferential order. Then, if an inference
is defeased in a better context we tend to look at it as somehow defective. That is exactly what
happens in the epistemological interpretation of defeasibility, in which contexts are ordered ac-
cording to the amount of information that is available in each of them. In such framework, it
is reasonable to point out, along with McDowell, that if an inference can be defeased in a better
epistemic context then it is not really valid after all. Let us consider a classical epistemic example.
Thus, let us suppose that John sees a lit candle in front of himself in a dark room and reports
“there is a lit candle in front of me”. Suppose however that, unbeknownst to him, he is facing
a mirror reflecting the light of a candle that is positioned behind his back where he can’t see it.
Suppose also that Mary knows of the mirror. Is John entitled, in his perspective, to the claim that
there is a lit candle in front of him? And is he entitled to it, in Mary’s perspective? Clearly, one is
willing to say that John only believes to be entitled while he actually is not. This is because Mary’s
perspective is epistemically privileged. Among other things, that also means that if John were in
Mary’s perspective he would not endorse his report himself. There is nothing wrong with this
analysis. The point, however, is that it is not obvious at all how contexts should be ordered on a
semantic interpretation of defeasible inferences.
Indeed there are two senses in which inferential relations can be construed as defeasible from
an inferentialist point of view. They correspond to the two ways in which the generation of the
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paradoxes of implication can be blocked that have been pointed out in Section 6. First, it could
be argued that the inferential relations that define certain conceptual contents are intrinsically
defeasible. This is all but a preposterous idea. Empirical concepts, as they have been molded by
the rise of modern science, just provide a paradigmatic example. These concepts are embedded
in a network of nomological relations whose validity essentially involves a number of potential
defeasors. Thus Galileo, for instance, came to define the law that describes the behavior of fallen
objects in gravity fields just by abstracting from potential defeasors like friction. In general, which
potential defeasors are relevant to the validity of nomological inferences depends on the context in
which the concept that they define is applied. Brandom’s analysis of observational reports can be
read as hinging just on this idea. In fact, part of the inferential content of the empirical concepts
that are applied in an observational judgment deals with the reliability inferences that allow to
infer the truth of the report from the reporter’s dispositions to differentially respond to certain
stimuli with certain pieces of linguistic behavior. So John, in the example here above, reacts to a
certain stimulation of his retina by uttering “there is a lit candle in front of me”, and, from the fact
that he is a reliable observer of lit candles, draws the conclusion that there is in effect a lit candle
in front of him. Such reliability inferences are defeasible: the reporter could be in anomalous per-
ceptual conditions, she could be deceived, disabled, drugged, etc. Yet, such defeasible inferences
define the content of the empirical concept applied in the reporter’s judgment. In this sense, as
far as the determination of which concept is applied in the report, it doesn’t matter whom the
reliability inference is performed by, whether by John or by Mary (Brandom, 2008a, pp. 102ff).15
A second sense in which the inferential relations that define conceptual contents can be con-
strued as defeasible in the framework of Brandom’s normative inferentialism deals with the inter-
action between the different perspectives of the discursive practitioners who keep each other’s
deontic score of commitments and entitlements. Brandom’s normative analysis of discursive
practices is perspectival through and through: each practitioner keeps the score of her peers in
the context of her additional commitments. And of course there is no privileged perspective, so
that the inferential relations that the scorekeepers’ deontic attitudes establish are defeasible to the
extent at which they can be considered from another deontic perspective. This means that the de-
termination of conceptual contents is defeasible as well. In fact, Brandom sees the determination
of conceptual contents, in Hegelian terms, as a process unfolding along the history of linguis-
tic communities constructed by speakers who reciprocally recognize the responsibility towards
each other’s authority as concept users (Brandom, 2011). In this second sense, defeasibility does
not intrinsically characterize the inferential relations that define the content of certain concepts.
There are no ceteris paribus conditions implicit in the validity of the inferences essentially involv-
ing these concepts. It does not even directly deal with the correctness of concept application, as
in the epistemological interpretation. There are no privileged contexts in which certain concept
applications are discovered to be mistaken. Rather, here defeasibility results from the attempt of
drawing inferences as from different perspectives. In order to understand what this means, con-
sider again the example of John and Mary and think about what happens if John is not willing
to recognize Mary’s authority over his application of the concept “lit candle”. Suppose, in other
15Of course this analysis belongs to a semantic account of the content of the empirical concepts that are applied in
observational judgments. Brandom’s theory of experience also contains the additional claim that the epistemological
problems of observational judgments are essentially semantic ones. By accepting McDowell’s analysis for the sake of the
argument, the latter claim has been bracketed to focus on the inferentialist approach proper.
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words, that he would not discard his report if he were in Mary’s perspective. What is put into
question, in this case, is neither whether potential defeasors of the inferences that define the con-
tents of the concepts that John applies are relevant in the given context, nor whether John applies
empirical concepts correctly, but whether he and Mary do apply the same concepts: in fact they
are evidently defined by different inferential relations and their inferential role is different. This
is why the inferences that characterize the content of John’s concepts turn out to be defeasible
once they are drawn in Mary’s perspective. In this framework, to recognize the responsibility
to each other’s authority over concept application is part and parcel with the determination of
conceptual content itself.
8 Conclusion
It is important to have a clear head on the scope of inferentialism while approaching the analysis
of empirical contents from an inferentialist point of view. My purpose in this paper was to iden-
tify some of the landmarks and draw some of the distinctions that may help characterizing such
a scope. In particular, I tried to show why McDowell’s inferentialist rephrasing of his own theory
of empirical knowledge may seems paradoxical when epistemological questions and semantic
questions are run together. On the other hand, I also tried to show that the representation of
different sorts of inferential relations and of the interaction of conceptual contents with different
inferential perspectives is within the proper scope of inferentialism. And that is not an easy task
to accomplish.
If there’s a lesson to be drawn from the Brandom-McDowell debate on observation, I think it
is the following: while the epistemological problem of experience might well be better exorcised
away, the semantical problem of experience is as much as intriguing and it is still there to be
solved.
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